#### Economic Zones/Industrial Estates as a Tool for Growth and Development: A Policy Case Study of Industrial Estates in Yangon, Myanmar

Kyaw Thu, PhD Programme Specialist (UN-Habitat) Urban Research and Development Institute, Myanmar ASEAN-KOREA Symposium – KRI-KDI MRH Regional Workshop (22/5/2015)

#### Background: Myanmar

- GDP is 59.44 US Billion (2012 UN Data) – growth 7.7% (2014) (ADB)
- Geographically largest in mainland Southeast Asia (676,578 sq-km)
- Population is 51.4 Mil (2014)
- Over 2,800 km of coastline to Indian Ocean through Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea
- Strategically borders China, Laos and Thailand in the East and Northeast and India and Bangladesh in the West and Northwest



#### Background: Political, Economical and Social Systems of Myanmar

- Monarchy system until 1885
- Gained independence from British in January 1948
- Parliament democracy system (AFPFL Rule) from 1948 to 1962 (Brief military rule from May 1958 to January 1960)
- Burmese Way to Socialism from 1962 to 1988 after coup d'état'
- Military rule from 1988 to 2011 (SLORC and SPDC)
- 2010 General Election
- 2011 to current (Democratic System)
- November 2015 election

Monarchy System          1885: Annexation by British         Colonial Economy         1948: Independence         Nationalized Market Economy	1962: Military Coup d'état Burmese Way to Socialism Limited Foreign engagement	Black Market Economy Two Demonetization	1987LDC 1988: SLORC Centralized, Open Market Economy Limited Foreign engagement	1997: SPDC Centralized, Open Market Economy ASEAN Membership	03 Bar	<ul> <li>Global Regional Engagement</li> <li>Series of Reforms and Decentralization</li> <li>2015 Democratic Election</li> </ul>
Late 19 <sup>th</sup> Century Meiji Revolution Japan Late 19 <sup>th</sup> Century Meiji Revolution Japan 1914 The Great War 1929 Great Depression 1939 WW II 1950 Korean War	1960s: Korean Industrialization started Japan Industrialization momentum gained Newly Industrializing Economies	Highly Performing Asian Econo Refor Global and Regiona	Globalization m and Economic G	1997 Asian Economic Crisis	2007-2011: Global Economic Crisis	ASEAN Economic Community 2015

#### **Drivers of Reform**

- Least developed country (LDC) status since 1987
- GDP per capita is 742 USD in 2010
- Gap in GDP per capita between Vietnam and Myanmar widened from USD 30 in 1990 to USD 432 in 2010 (ERIA, 2013)
- People living under poverty line is 25.6 % in 2010
- Human Development Index (HDI) in 2012 is 0.498 (second lowest in the region)
- Life expectancy at birth is 65.7 years (lower than average)


# **Drivers of Reform**

- Control-oriented disposition still remains
- Rich and poor gap has increased
- Monopoly of State Owned Enterprises, especially military owned economic enterprises on Myanmar economy has rooted; cronyism was born in this period
- Sanctions and embargos still present
- Extractive industries dominated FDIs (Oil and gas, mining etc.,)
- Doing Business 182 out of 186 in 2014 and 177 in 2015
- Government recognized unsustainable economy and political system – elections in 2010

# **Reform Dynamics**

- ASEAN membership in 1997, Leadership in 2014 agreement of ASEAN Economic Community (2015) and AFTA
- Greater Mekong Sub-region cooperation
- US reconciliation in 2011 (lifted sanctions)
- European Union (EU) has also lifted trade, economic and individual sanctions
- However, the reform momentum relies heavily on the stability and positive political shift of Myanmar (politics over economy)

#### **Reform Dynamics**



#### Figure: GDP by industrial origins

# **Reform Policy**

- Framework for Economic and Social Reforms (FESR) 2012-2015
  - 1. fiscal and tax reform,
  - 2. monetary and finance sector reform,
  - 3. liberalization of trade and investment,
  - 4. private sector development,
  - 5. health and education,
  - 6. food security and agricultural growth,
  - 7. governance and transparency,
  - 8. mobile telephone and internet,
  - 9. infrastructure, and
  - 10. effective and efficient government.
- Reform Phases: 1) political reforms 2) economic reforms
   3) public administration reforms and 4) private sector development reforms

# **Reform Policy**

- A three pillar strategy:
  - Agriculture plus plus which is to improve value addition of agriculture products and bring more raw materials to the industrial and manufacturing sector,
  - FDI driven and export oriented strategy which is to bring foreign investment, technologies, and international market while creating new demand for agricultural products and
  - Two-polar balanced economic growth with enhanced connectivity

#### **Economic/Industrial Zone Environment in Myanmar**





Figure: Key Players of SEZs/Izs/IEs


#### Industrial Estates: Yangon

- Introduced Industrial Zones and Special Economic Zones since 1990s (SLORC-SPDC)
- Yangon area is the earliest and by far the largest
- It has highest profit, sales and employees within Myanmar industrial estates
- Mainly garment, textile, food and beverage etc
- Thiliwa SEZ, a joint venture between Myanmar and Japan is a leading SEZ which will be operating this year



#### Industrial Estates: Yangon

- Introduced Industrial Zones and Special Economic Zones since 1990s (SLORC-SPDC)
- Yangon area is the earliest and by far the largest
- It has highest profit, sales and employees within Myanmar industrial estates
- Mainly garment, textile, food and beverage etc
- Thiliwa SEZ, a joint venture between Myanmar and Japan is a leading SEZ which will be operating this year



# Challenges: State's Capacity

- Institutional capacity to effectively implement the industrialization policy
  - President's export-oriented FDI-led policy is clear
  - States agencies' capacity to implement them effectively on ground is limited
  - Regulatory framework and institutional structure for the industry sectors are fragmented
  - Linkage and the cooperation between union level committees, line ministries, regional government focal and private sector are limited

- Clear leadership on development and management of industrial estates is limited
  - Devolution of administration and decentralization diluted the capacity of central government including industrial policy
  - Responsibility for the industrial estates is split
  - Leadership and coordination is lacking due to unclear and overlapping roles and responsibilities, and professional management of the industrial zones is limited.

- Low standards of existing industrial estates
  - Current business environment in the country is rated poor (Doing Business 177 in 2015, 182 in 2014)
  - Poor basic infrastructure (electricity, energy, water, telecommunication etc)
  - Little emphasis on offering a package of incentives to potential investors
  - Government (national and sub-national) commitment is varying including Yangon estates

- No integrated development policy (industrial estates and other development plans)
  - Industrial estate formulations are disconnected from national economic strategies, as well as urbanization trends
  - Comparative advantage such as good strategic location, low cost of labor, proximity to urban growth centers etc., are not maximized effectively

- Land Issues (weak legal frameworks)
  - Some land plots in industrial estates including Yangon are unoccupied but their owners retain the land for land speculation (e.g. warehouses, renting etc.,)
  - High start up costs
  - Squatter issues
  - Compensation without recourse to further discussion
  - Deters investors who genuinely wish to invest and relocate from countries where labor is becoming expensive (China plus one, Thailand plus one etc.)

- Labor availability is poor and quality is a challenge
  - Out-migration (both illegal and legal means) led to Myanmar not a labor surplus country
  - Skill-mix is poor with mindset and professionalism among the problems within the labor force
  - Output of vocational schools has been limited
  - Low cost labor which could overcome the other disadvantage is not a given, due to poor efficiency and productivity

- Multi-modal linkage with transport and logistics infrastructure is poor
  - Shipping costs are high due to infrequency of liner services and being off the main ocean routes.
  - 0.17 million TEU of port container freight in 2010, the second lowest in ASEAN
  - Air cargo is in its infancy while most overland routes are poor and will remain so for the next three years at least.
  - Road density is lowest (41.3/1000km-sq), and paved road percent is one of the lowest in ASEAN countries.
  - Quality of rail service and connectivity is also poor
  - Agglomeration impacts and clustering are not considered systematically.

- Poor capital and financing mechanisms
  - Financial services are weak, international transactions/foreign exchanges complex with long processes
  - Bank loans are limited to most local firms and SMEs with collateral main obstacles but money inside the banks is nearly half of national GDP



- Technology and Innovation
  - Lack of investment in R&D, poor ICT infrastructure and basic services leads to low level of innovation in both public and private sectors
  - Many of the firms are CMPs, and thus technology transfer from foreign firms to local firms is limited
  - Goods produced are little or no high tech products, with mainly food and beverages, garment and apparels, construction and other raw materials

- Other management capacity and issues include:
  - red tape/procedures/coordination/bureaucratic capacity limitation due to years of isolation and dictatorship, and lack of development support
  - policy uncertainty due to politics and reshuffling of local authorities
  - weak private sector and SME development due to limitation of cooperation and understanding within the sectors
  - limited interaction of union/sub-national government and poor coordination
  - no accurate data/market information
  - lack of effective environmental controls and
  - poor governance leading to rank seeking behavior.

#### **Policy Evaluation**

- The results of the reform process initiated (first phase after 1988 and second phase after election of 2010) are positive if looking at the steady GDP increase
- But the true potential of Myanmar has not been realised through industrialization and manufacturing (agriculture still dominating although trend is shifting).

#### Structure of Economy




Figure: Structural output: percent of GDP at current prices by industry sectors in Myanmar (Source ADB Key Indicators Asia and Pacific 2014) 25

- Use urbanization trends effectively in designing the industrial estates
- Develop a robust legal and regulatory framework addressing the fragmentation of industrialization policies, financial institutions and most importantly land disputes
- Upgrade the capacity of line agencies and the state to act as a lead and facilitator

- Improve the overall governance and transparency
- Increase cooperation and coordination between stakeholders - government agencies, facilitators and private sector
- Improve private sector development especially SMEs

- Upgrade both personal and institutional levels, and establish strong working partnerships with regional forums (ASEAN, GMS, etc.,)
- Academic and research/development institutions must be linked to both the government and private sectors.
- Capacity building programs must be developed for concerned government agencies, at national, state/region and local levels.

- Rationalizing of the government agencies in economic development, state and region developments and urban and rural spatial planning is needed
- Areas of overlap should be clear and strategically defined
- Introduce monitoring and evaluation mechanism

#### Conclusion

- Myanmar now has a chance to truly realize its industrialization potential by maintaining macroeconomic and political stability
- Priority areas should be focused on government's vision, and capacity to designing competitive industrial estates, integrated package of policies, legal frameworks, institution, governance and systems; and private sector development.

Thank you...